Abstract
In a two-system theory for mind-reading, a flexible system (FS) enables full-blown mind-reading, and an efficient system (ES) enables early mind-reading. Efficient processing differs from flexible processing in terms of restrictions on the kind of input it can take and the kinds of mental states it can ascribe (output). Thus, systems are not continuous and each relies on different representations: the FS on beliefs and other propositional attitudes, and the ES on belief-like states or registrations. There is a conceptual problem in distinguishing the representations each system operates with. They contend that they can solve this problem by appealing to a characterization of registrations based on signature limits, but this does not work. I suggest a solution to this problem. The difference between registration and belief becomes clearer if each vehicle turns out to be different. I offer some reasons in support of this proposal related to the performance of spontaneous-response false belief tasks.
Highlights
Recent studies suggest that humans seem to track their conspecifics’ mental states, such as their goals and beliefs, from early infancy (e.g., [1,2])
The aim of this paper is to contribute to solving the problem of the nature of the representations the efficient mind-reading system operates with
What is important for the purpose of this argument is that the object detection task is combined with a false belief task (FBT) where conditions
Summary
Recent studies suggest that humans seem to track their conspecifics’ mental states, such as their goals and beliefs, from early infancy (e.g., [1,2]). In contrast to a standard (or elicited-response) false belief task (FBT) , these studies employed spontaneous-response FBT— known as non-verbal or implicit tasks—that no longer require an explicit answer to a question about the protagonist’s belief (e.g., [2]). Whether or not these abilities involve representing beliefs has been intensely debated. The mind-reading accounts claim that infants’ social cognitive abilities manifest a capacity to attribute beliefs [4,5,6] This capacity is of the adult kind, and researchers have appealed to performance factors to explain infants’ failures in elicited-response FBT. The non-mind-reading accounts contend that mentalist understanding is not necessary to explain infants’ behavior in spontaneous-response FBT
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
