Mind and World: From Soft Naturalism to Anti-naturalism

Abstract

This paper seeks to move from soft naturalism to anti-naturalism with regard to the understanding of mind and the world. John McDowell has already laid down the groundwork of soft naturalism or limited naturalism in his framework of understanding of the relation between mind and the world. McDowell’s argument is based on his commitment to some form of naturalism as against what he calls “bald naturalism.” His form of naturalism is derived from his idea of “second nature,” which places the space of reasons within the realm of second nature as distinguished from the realm of first nature. The latter is the realm of law, while the former is the realm of reasons. Thus, McDowell reconciles rationalism or Platonism with naturalism by showing that reason must be placed within the realm of human nature, if not in the realm of the natural world. My argument is that even soft naturalism cannot be reconciled with rationalism because we have far more responsibility to place normativity and reasons away from nature, even if the latter is the human nature. Human nature is an extension of the natural world, and there must be a decisive break between the realm of reasons and the so-called second nature.