Abstract
Abstract In the aftermath of Peter Singer’s ‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’, the argument he put forward received significant criticism, largely on the grounds that it demanded too much of moral agents. Several attempts have been made since to formulate moral principles that adequately express the stringency of our duties of beneficence. Richard Miller proposed one such option, which has several advantages over Singer’s principle. In particular, because it concerns our dispositions rather than operating over every possible occasion for beneficence, it avoids problems of iterative demands. However, I argue that Miller’s principle is inadequate, because 1) it seems too weak, 2) it appears to be ambiguous and 3) it can give unduly harsh verdicts on unlucky moral agents.
Highlights
In the aftermath of Peter Singer’s ‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’, the argument he put forward received significant criticism, largely on the grounds that it demanded too much of moral agents
Several attempts have been made since to formulate moral principles that adequately express the stringency of our duties of beneficence
In ‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’, Peter Singer endorses the moral principle that “If it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it” ( Sacrifice) (Singer 1972, p. 231)
Summary
Richard Miller sees his project as a direct reaction to Peter Singer’s extremism. He concedes that while Singer’s principle looks extremely plausible, upon reflection, its demandingness “misconstrues ordinary morality” (Miller 2004, p. 358). Sacrifice would not allow agents such indulgences, but Miller’s Sympathy does encourage people to pursue “worthwhile goals” These goals are seen as basic interests; those that give “point and value to specific choices and plans” Miller holds that equal respect is universally acknowledged as good, and explains that it does not entail equal concern or equal treatment, but it isn’t exactly clear what this lofty notion – ‘equal respect’ – means It seems that Miller sees this as suggesting to us all a particular way of thinking about agents and requiring a degree of consideration.
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