Military Service and Congressional Decision-Making: Self-Selection, Socialization, and the Vietnam Draft Lottery

Abstract

Research suggests military service influences the policy preferences of elites, including members of the U.S. Congress. These studies have not considered how self-selection may confound these results. I employ vulnerability to the Vietnam draft lottery to consider two mechanisms for the influence of military service on policy preferences: self-selection and socialization. I compare the roll call votes of Representatives across the 94th to 113th Congresses who were eligible for the draft and who served in the military to those who were eligible for the draft but did not serve. There is a significant difference in the roll call voting behavior between these two groups on foreign and defense policy issues. This distinction cannot be explained by self-selection effects alone, indicating military service is transformative and carrying implications for Congressional oversight, the influence of military experience on elite behavior, and how the personal experiences of elites influence their decision-making.