Abstract
This article compares military regimes in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay to show the political challenges military governments confront in implementing privatization policies. Using a case-study approach, it describes the effect of differences in long-standing characteristics of the armed forces, and in the military regime's governing institutions on the political survival strategies of military rulers. Analysis of the data on privatization under military rule in these countries suggests that consolidated one-man rule provides advantages over more collegial forms of military rule when it comes to selecting economic policy makers and directors of state-owned enterprises who will facilitate privatizing state enterprises. Furthermore, the findings reveal how rarely military regimes succeed in achieving their privatization goals.
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