Military-protester relations: Insights from nonviolence research

Brian Martin

doi:10.35467/sdq/141545

Abstract

Military forces are sometimes called out to confront unarmed civilian protesters, a contingency for which they may or may not be prepared. Studies of civil-military relations have focused on relations between civilian and military elites, with interactions between armed forces and civilian protesters given little or no attention. The objective here is to improve understanding of military-protester dynamics. Key relevant features of nonviolent action are outlined, including methods, campaign stages and theoretical assumptions, with a particular focus on interactions with troops. The implications for military-protester dynamics are spelled out with illustrations from several protest campaigns. When troops use force against non-resistant protesters, this sometimes creates more support for the protest movement, a process called political jiu-jitsu. An important method used by some protesters is fraternisation, namely trying to win over troops to their side. Commanders and troops, through their actions, can encourage or discourage protesters’ use of nonviolent methods. Learning about military-protester dynamics is important for both strategists and practitioners.

Highlights

Military forces are trained and prepared to use force
In the past century there has been a dramatic increase in engagements between troops and civilian protesters
Troops seldom have a deep understanding of or extensive preparation for encounters with protesters who use these sorts of methods

Summary

Introduction

Military forces are trained and prepared to use force. Protesters have been prepared, sometimes trained, in the use of nonviolent action, which includes rallies, strikes, boycotts, sit-ins, blockades, alternative government and a host of other methods (Sharp, 1973). As the days passed and the massive rallies continued, more soldiers defected and international support for Marcos waned. He eventually fled the country and Aquino became president (Kerkvliet and Mojares, 1991; Mackenzie, 1987; Seagrave, 1988; Thompson, 1995; Zunes, 1999). Looking at the dramatic street confrontations from the point of view of soldiers, many of them had difficult decisions to make about whether to remain loyal to the regime, whether to use force against civilians and whether to obey orders

Objectives

Conclusion