Military Preparedness and Security Needs: Perceptions from the Republic of China on Taiwan

Abstract

WHILE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S Relations Act of 1979 clearly states that the security of Taiwan is a serious concern of the United States, diverse opinions have been expressed in both countries about the security risks Taiwan is exposed to following the disruption of diplomatic relations between the Republic of China (ROC) and the United States. A number of American observers, both in and out of government service, maintain that the termination of the 1954 Sino-American Mutual Defense Pact and the breakup of U.S.-ROC diplomatic relations not only had not damaged Taiwan's security position but rather had reduced Taiwan's security needs. Richard Holbrook, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs in the Carter administration, for example, contends that the Taiwan Strait is calmer now than at any point in the previous three decades, and that, in fact, Taiwan faces no threat of a military nature from Communist China. The argument that Taiwan's security risks are diminishing is based on the following assumptions: 1. The Moscow-Beijing antagonism is likely to persist. With the Soviet Union deploying about 20-25% of its ground forces along the Sino-Soviet border, and concentrating up to one third of its naval forces in Pacific waters, Communist China would not dare to commit its forces against Taiwan, for that may tempt the Soviet Union to attack mainland China from the rear and would thus open up a dangerous twofront war. 2. Deng Xiaoping's political leadership in Beijing is likely to pre-