Military (mis)adventures in Mali

Abstract

Thefrench military intervention that officially started on 11 January 2013 has reshaped the Malian crisis. It raises questions regarding the French government's understanding of the situation in northern Mali, the attitude of the African and international communities, and the ability of military interventions to address problems that go beyond security concerns about Jihadist, Islamist, or criminal movements in the Sahel.1 The French intervention came in response to an offensive by armed Islamist groups against Konna, Sevare airport, and Mopti. This attack broke an implicit agreement with the government in Bamako that no armed entities would cross a political boundary that had been set up in the spring of 2012. The reasons for this breach are not yet known, but the attacks were in part triggered by the political dialogue in Ouagadougou and Algiers regarding how to resolve the crisis, and the impact this had on the constituency of the main Islamist armed groups in northern Mali.2 Although France was sceptical of the value of engaging armed groups in talks, ECOWAS mediator Blaise Compaoré argued that this was the best way to offer a settlement. The talks failed to deliver, but it nevertheless seems likely that the prospect of a negotiated settlement increased tensions within some of the armed groups. The subsequent establishment of the Movement for the Islamic Azawad (MIA) led by Alghabass ag Inthallah3 on 23 January 2013 can be read as the external manifestation of these tensions, as well as a product of a complex entanglement of ethnic ties, ideological inclinations, and political opportunism.