Military Force in the Foreign Policy of the Eisenhower Presidency

Abstract

Politicians, scholars, and much of the American public see the use of military force in international politics as an extremely complex and controversial issue. There are very few who hold with Karl von Clausewitz that force is only one more component of an admixture of means that the prudent statesman is justified in using safeguard national interests. More prevalent is the view that force is an instrument be used only in the most extreme circumstances and that its use in situations short of struggles for national survival brings forth serious moral questions. Samuel P. Huntington points out a strong undercurrent in the American political culture that fundamentally opposes government power and the concentration of authority. This leads, he argues, to efforts minimize and restrict the resources of power (such as arms), restrict the effectiveness of the specialized bureaucratic hierarchies, and limit the authority of the executive in the conduct of foreign policy.' American unease about force as a foreign policy instrument has been particularly evident since the mid-1960s. War in Vietnam and Cambodia, the temporary demise of the Cold War world view, the excesses of the imperial presidency, and events in Iran, Lebanon, Grenada, and elsewhere have led continual debate over the efficacy of force and reassessments of presidential powers and decision-making processes. The War Powers Resolution, passed by Congress in 1973 limit the president's ability employ military forces in hostile environ-