Migrations de main-d'œuvre dans le monde arabe : l'envers du Nouvel Ordre économique

Abstract

Population and petroleum, 2 essential factors in the development of the Arab world, are unequally distributed in the 18 Arab countries. The abstract possibility of mutually beneficial cooperation between the countries with large populations and no oil and those with oil but small populations is far from being realized; on the contrary, growing inequality and deterioration of human and productive resources can be observed in the Arab world. The apparent economic progress of the oil producing states is illusory, because it has permitted them to defer development of their own internal resources such as agriculture, industry, professional training and education in favor of greater dependence on the temporary palliative of petroleum revenues. In 1980, over 3 million Arabs had emigrated toward other Arab countries, where they were joined by approximately 1.8 million non-Arabs. 4 types of Arab migration have been important: movement from the countryside to cities within countries, movement of Arab migrants to non-Arab countries, movement from 1 Arab state to another because of political factors and especially to earn high wages in the oil producing states, and immigration of non-Arabs and especially Asians to Arab countries. 6 of the principal manpower importing countries, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar, had total labor forces of about 5.2 million in 1985, of which only 41% were nationals. There have been 4 main consequences for the states importing manpower: 1) petroleum production is very capital intensive and creates few jobs; the jobs filled by migrants are mostly in construction and services funded by oil revenues 2) the expansion is temporary because petroleum is a nonrenewable resource; the manpower transfers will therefore not be permanent 3) the migrants represent a large proportion of the labor force and populations of the Gulf oil-producing states, and 4) the migrants are systematically excluded from the political and social life of the countries in which they work, have no juridical protection or political rights, and are the objects of growing hostility in the countries where they work. The most important consequence may be the least visible: because of the petroleum income and the migratory flows the local populations are less and less motivated to work. The immigrants are almost all single or unaccompanied men who send most of their earnings to their home countries. Thus far there has been little apparent political activity or labor unrest among them in the host countries, but it is unclear how long the apparent calm can be sustained. The most obvious consequence of the migration for the sending countries is the massive flow of remittances. In 1980, such transfers between Arab countries were estimated to total around $3 billion, not counting income in kind. The remittances do not appear to be invested in productive enterprises with any frequency but rather to be used for purchases of mostly imported consumer goods and in speculation. Few migrants learn useful job skills, and some countries have lost large proportions of their skilled workers to migration. Migrant earnings have depressed local production by encouraging imports, especially of foodstuffs, and have fostered inflation by stimulating demand for land and wage increases.