Abstract

AbstractThis article addresses two questions: First, how does the value of human dignity distinctively bear on a state’s responsibilities in relation to migrants; and, secondly, how serious a wrong is it when a state fails to respect the dignity of migrants? In response to these questions, a view is presented about the distinction between wrongs that violate cosmopolitan standards and wrongs that violate the standards that are distinctive to a particular community; about when and how the contested concept of human dignity might be engaged; and, elaborating a three‐tiered and lexically ordered scheme of state responsibilities, about how we should assess the seriousness of a state’s failure to respect the dignity of migrants.

Highlights

  • Questions about the responsibilities of nation states to “migrants”—employing this term in a generic sense to denote those persons who are seeking to leave home country A and be admitted to prospective host country B1—bring cosmopolitan virtue into headline tension with local sovereignty (Spijkerboer 2010; Valadez 2010)

  • My proposal is that, when we are debating the state’s responsibilities in relation to migrants, we should frame our thinking in the terms of this three-tiered scheme—where, to repeat, the first-tier responsibilities are cosmopolitan and non-negotiable; where the responsibilities at the second and third tiers are contingent, depending on the fundamental values and the interests recognised in each particular community; and, where vertical conflicts are to be resolved lexically by reference to the tiers of importance, responsibilities, and interests that are engaged by a higher-tier always outranking those in a lower tier

  • Whether or not we treat this as a failure relative to human dignity depends on whether we conceive of human dignity as covering the full range of commons’ conditions or a more limited set of the conditions (Brownsword 2017)

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Summary

Introduction

Questions about the responsibilities of nation states to “migrants”—employing this term in a generic sense to denote those persons who are seeking to leave home country A and be admitted to prospective host country B (or to some intermediate country, C, en route to B)1—bring cosmopolitan virtue into headline tension with local sovereignty (Spijkerboer 2010; Valadez 2010). In the two most relevant United Nations’ global compacts—one for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCSORM 2018) and the other on Refugees (GCR 2018)—we find much about the responsibilities of nation states and much about respect for human rights but very little explicitly about human dignity. If these compacts are intended to be applications of human dignity to a pressing global problem, they do not advertise this fact. My concluding take-home messages are: (i) that there is more than one way in which a state might fail to meet its responsibilities in relation to the treatment of migrants; (ii) that, while some failures might engage cosmopolitan standards, other wrongs and failures are relative to the standards of the particular community; (iii) that we can assess the seriousness of a state’s particular failure, as well as whether it relates to cosmopolitan or community standards, only if we have a clear picture of the different levels (tiers) of state responsibility; (iv) that, whether or not we judge that a particular failure or wrong involves a lack of respect for, or compromising of, human dignity will depend upon our conceptual understanding and interpretation of human dignity (including its relationship with human rights); and (v) that, before we can answer our principal questions—that is, before we say why it is that a state’s treatment of migrants violates human dignity and how serious that violation is—we need to be clear about both human dignity (speaking to what is distinctively wrong in a state’s treatment of migrants) and the levels of state responsibility (speaking to the seriousness of the state’s wrong and whether or not it violates cosmopolitan standards)

The Two Global Compacts
State Responsibilities: A Three-Tiered Analysis
The First-Tier Stewardship Responsibility for the Commons
Human Dignity and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
The Provisions in the Opening Chapter of the Charter
Reading Up the Provisions
Reading Down the Provisions
The Inviolability of Dignity
Human Dignity and the State’s Responsibility to Migrants
The Bioethicists’ Letter
The Responsibilities of the Host State
The Responsibilities of the State of Origin
Taking Stock
Conclusion
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