Might Knowledge Be Insertable?

Abstract

AbstractCan we coherently conceive of our having knowledge inserted into our minds, bypassing forms of knowledge acquisition hitherto relied on? In this article, John Tillson contends that there is value in giving serious consideration to this question. First, insofar as technology develops apace, it is wise to start thinking about how we would use it before its uses are available to us lest we should unreflectively abuse it. Second, even though having knowledge inserted might turn out to be physically impossible, its metaphysical possibility would still make reflecting on its desirability fruitful, since evaluating this will help us to better understand what it is that we value about education and about knowledge. While handling practical knowledge and theoretical knowledge (or “knowledge how” and “knowledge that”) somewhat separately, Tillson argues that, for each, insertion is conceivable. He contends that if (a) we seem to be able to imagine inserting knowledge, (b) our seeming to be able to imagine it survives extended critical reflection, and (c) we can elaborate what it would consist of with plausible detail, then we have defeasible reason for thinking that inserting knowledge is in fact metaphysically possible. In the first section, Tillson begins by motivating the question, next briefly considers an imaginary scenario presented in the film The Matrix as an example of what is meant by implanting or inserting knowledge, and then fleshes out the scenario with some more plausible details to help make the case for its coherent conceivability. In the second section, he discusses five objections to the thesis, so as to subject the case to extended critical reflection. These include arguments that inserting knowledge requires inserting justification, but that justification cannot be inserted; that the possibility of inserting false beliefs undermines the possibility of self‐trust, which is crucial to knowledge; that inserted content has the wrong causal history to count as knowledge; and that inserted knowledge would lack the appropriate connections to other mental items in order to count as knowledge. Upon answering each of these objections, Tillson concludes that the notion of knowledge insertion as coherently conceivable can survive extended critical reflection.