Middle-Ground Theorizing, Realism, and Objectivity in Psychology

Abstract

Held's (2007) critical analysis of the ontological and epistemological positions of theoretical psychologists whom she labels “middle-ground theorists” is examined, and her own positions concerning realism, truth, and objectivity in psychology are considered. Several key misinterpretations and misunderstandings are identified in Held's account, and her own theoretical framework is judged to be untenable with respect to the phenomena of psychology. In particular, Held's equation of interpretation with subjectivist anti-objectivism, her commitment to discourse-independent, universal claims to truth with respect to psychological phenomena, and her failure to grasp the nature of constitutive relations between psychological phenomena and the sociocultural practices in which they are embedded cloud her interpretations of the theoretical perspectives she attacks. She is thus prevented from perceiving the impossibility of achieving the kind of de-contextualized, psychological objectivism she desires as a basis for psychological agency.