Microtargeting, Dogwhistles, and Deliberative Democracy

Abstract

‘Dogwhistles’ and microtargeted political advertisements are objects of widespread moral and political concern. With a few notable exceptions in the case of dogwhistles (and none in the case of microtargeting) moral criticism of these speech act types generally focuses on problematic content—that a dogwhistle is, for instance, racist, or a microtargeted advertisement misleading. I argue that these practices are additionally morally wrongful on content-neutral grounds—regardless of their content. My argument proceeds from a deliberative conception of democracy according to which only a vote which follows from an adequate deliberative process confers democratic legitimacy on its results. I claim that both dogwhistles and microtargeting threaten to prevent adequate democratic deliberation from taking place, and therefore that these practices are anti-democratic and, additionally, morally impermissible. I then discuss potential objections and how my argument relates to existing work.