Abstract

The Amerindian allies of New France accepted annual French invitations to take part in Seven Years' War but decided themselves how many warriors would actually appear in field. These decisions were made in response to two smallpox epidemics that broke out during war. The numbers of Amerindian warriors fighting alongside French declined precipitously after outbreaks of smallpox but rose again when they had passed. The arrival of Europeans created a new worldl for native peoples of North America. Postcontact Amerindians had no choice but to confront challenge of life in a once-familiar habitat that was now infested with new groups of humans and flora, fauna, and microbes that accompanied them. Two manifestations of radically changed geopolitical and biological environments created by newcomers to North America were epidemic disease and intra-European warfare.2 In mid-eighteenth century, Amerindians of Great Lakes (among others) faced both when a series of epidemics broke out during Seven Years' War. Their response, at once pragmatic and informed, reveals something of Amerindian adjustment to realities of life in postcontact North America, a process that remains in progress as twentieth century draws to a close. Following establishment of European settlements in North America, Amerindians were frequently drawn into warfare between rival colonies. The issues at stake might or might not directly affect their concerns, but belligerent Europeans invariably attempted to involve their Amerindian allies in these conflicts. Amerindian participation in warfare demanded decisions by groups and individuals regarding whether or not to go to war and number of Ethnohistory 39:I (Winter I992). Copyright ? by American Society for Ethnohistory. ccc OOI4-i8o/ 9z/$i.50. This content downloaded from 157.55.39.145 on Sat, 02 Jul 2016 04:29:33 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Smallpox and Amerindians in Seven Years' War warriors that would actually fight. These decisions could be based upon factors ranging from cold calculations of geopolitical advantage to desire for recreation and individual prestige.3 Throughout Seven Years' War, Amerindian allies of New France had to decide how to respond to annual invitations to go to war in central theater on behalf of French.4 The details of their deliberations are unrecorded, but results were manifested in a series of dramatic fluctuations in numbers of Amerindians serving alongside French in this theater, as individuals and groups elected to proffer or withhold their services. These variations correspond to smallpox epidemics. Sharp declines in size of Amerindian contingent in central theater occurred immediately after outbreaks of disease; when epidemics had passed, their numbers in field increased once more. Whatever positive factors impelled Amerindians to go to war in I750s, numbers of warriors who actually took part in campaigns in central theater between 1755 and 1759 were determined by reactions of allies to flourishing and fading of smallpox virus.5 The first official French contacts with inhabitants of New World in I53os were characterized by treachery and violence on part of French adventurers, who quickly alienated Amerindians. Nevertheless, in first decades of seventeenth century, a second wave of French expeditions established amicable and mutually profitable relations with native people and began to form concomitant military alliances that would endure until British conquest. The Seven Years' War was last, supreme test of effectiveness of Franco-Amerindian alliance system. With New France fighting for its very survival and heavily outnumbered in field, both by Anglo-American colonials and by British regulars, French relied to a considerable extent upon manpower provided by their Amerindian allies to offset imbalance. Without them, conceded one French staff officer who had no particular love for Amerindians, the odds would be too unequal for us.6 In event, alliance system rose to challenge and proved capable of delivering a substantial force of Amerindian warriors to fight alongside French regulars and Canadian militiamen.7 While war in North America raged from Louisbourg in Acadia to Fort Duquesne on Ohio, most important region for defense of New France was central theater, which comprised seigneurial tract of Canada, together with its approaches, and extended from eastern Lake Ontario to Quebec.8 Rather than form raiding parties, like their counterparts in Acadia and Ohio country, bulk of Amerindians serving in this sector were employed as auxiliaries to French field army, 43 This content downloaded from 157.55.39.145 on Sat, 02 Jul 2016 04:29:33 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call