Michael Polanyi's Republic of Science: The Tacit Dimension

Abstract

Michael Polanyi spent his long career thinking and writing about the workings of science and the scientific community. Moreover, he saw in the workings of that community the core principles and practices of the good political republic, as spelled out in his famous essay, ‘The Republic of Science’. There is, however, a tension between his political theory and his epistemological contribution, in particular his path-breaking writings about the tacit dimension in knowledge formation—or what he described as ‘personal knowledge’. On the one hand, his political essay supports a classical conservative position, while on the other, his theory of tacit knowledge anticipates much of the post-modern radical critique of long-standing Enlightenment assumptions about scientific objectivity and the disinterested pursuit of knowledge. This otherwise contradictory position can be understood by following Polanyi's own epistemological prescription, namely by examining the underlying assumptions that constitute his own tacit knowledge. Polanyi's personal history reveals the less-apparent assumptions tacitly underlying his republic of science. Polanyi's own ‘fiduciary community’—in particular, his deep personal and intellectual ties to classical conservative theory, his association with Frederick von Hayek, and his membership in the neo-liberal Mont Pelerin Society—shaped his theoretical conceptualization of the so-called ‘republic of science’. In this way, Polanyi's political contribution diverges from his own epistemological requirements, in a way that largely obscures important intellectual roots required to properly interpret his political thought.