Metrological problems in the study of weapon systems

With the advancement of information technology (IT), the importance of cyber security is increasing because of the expansion of software utilization in the development of weapon systems. Civilian embedded systems and military weapon systems have cybersecurity-related symmetry that can increase vulnerabilities in the process of advanced information technology. Many countries, including the United States, are exploring ways to improve cybersecurity throughout the lifecycle of a weapon system. The South Korean military is applying the U.S. standard risk management framework (RMF) to some weapon systems to improve cybersecurity, but the need for a model that is more suitable for the South Korean military has been emphasized. This paper presents the results of a mission-based cybersecurity test, along with an evaluation model that can be applied to South Korean military weapon systems in parallel with the RMF. This study first examined the related international research trends, and proposed a test and evaluation method that could be utilized with the RMF throughout the entire life cycle of a weapon system. The weapon system was divided into asset, function, operational task, and mission layers based on the mission, and a mutually complementary model was proposed by linking the RMF and cybersecurity test and evaluation according to the domestic situation. In order to verify the proposed cybersecurity test and evaluation model, a simulation was developed and performed targeting the Close Air Support (CAS) mission support system, which is a virtual weapon system. In this simulation, the nodes performances by layer before and after a cyberattack were calculated, and the vulnerabilities and protection measures identified in the cyber security test and evaluation were quantified. This simulation made it possible to evaluate and derive protection measures in consideration of mission performance. It is believed that the proposed model could be used with some modifications, depending on the circumstances of each country developing weapon systems in the future.

Effectiveness Evaluation of Air and Missile Defense System Based on Parametric Diagrams

The Weapons Evaluation Test Laboratory (WETL), operated by Sandia Laboratories at the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas, is engaged primarily in the testing of weapon systems in the stockpile or of newly produced weapon systems for the Sandia Surety Assessment Center. However, the WETL`s unique testing equipment and data-handling facilities are frequently used to serve other organizations. Service to other organizations includes performing special tests on weapon components, subassemblies, and systems for purposes such as basic development and specific problem investigation. The WETL staff also sends equipment to other laboratories for specific tests that cannot be performed at Pantex. For example, we modified and sent equipment to Brookhaven National Laboratory for testing with their Neutral Particle Beam. WETL supplied the engineering expertise to accomplish the needed modifications to the equipment and the technicians to help perform many special tests at Brookhaven. A variety of testing is possible within the WETL, including: Accelerometer, decelerometer, and G-switch g-level/closure testing; Neutron generator performance testing; weapon systems developmental tests; weapon system component testing; weapon system failure-mode-duplication tests; simultaneity measurements; environmental extreme testing; parachute deployment testing; permissive action link (PAL) testing and trajectory-sensing signal generator (TSSG) testing. WETL`s existing equipment configurations do not restrict the testing performed at the WETL. Equipment and facilities are adapted to specific requirements. The WETL`s facilities can often eliminate the need to build or acquire new test equipment, thereby saving time and expense.

In the era of the 4th Industrial Revolution, the current Korean military's demand planning and weapon system acquisition method was suggest to improve measures for cutting-edge technology applied weapon system. Currently, the problem of the Korean military weapon system acquisition system is the demand-oriented planning and acquiring. The demand-oriented weapon system has the advantage of securing the weapon system that the military needs, but it lacks flexibility considering the shortened life-cycle of technology and changes in the security environment. In particular, more innovative planning is needed to solve the problems of troop reduction and insufficient quantitative and qualitative military power compared to neighbor countries. To do so, it is essential to secure a qualitative advantage by developing leading technologies and securing a weapon system to which leading technologies are applied. In this study, demand-push, demand-pull, technology-push, and technology-pull frameworks, which are methods of market innovation, were introduced to analyze military's planning and acquiring weapon systems. A theoretical framework was presented so that the weapon system planning and acquisition methods could be classified and analyzed in more detail. In addition, an institutions were proposed to develop future weapon system with leading technologies.

Availability is a determining factor in systems characterization. Because military systems must act in a hostile environment, they are particularly vulnerable in situations of unavailability. Military weapon systems can become unavailable due to system failures or damage to the system; in both cases, system regeneration is needed to restore availability. However, very few of the general dependability studies or even the more specific availability studies take battlefield damage into account. This paper aims to define principles for weapon systems modeling that integrate both system failure and system damage, as well as the possibility of regeneration, into operational availability assessment. This modeling method uses a unified failure/damage approach based on state-space modeling.

Personnel in medical, veterinary or research laboratories may be exposed to a wide variety of pathogens that range from deadly to debilitating. For some of these pathogens, no treatment is available, and in other cases the treatment does not fully control the disease. It is important that personnel in laboratories that process human or microbiological specimens follow universal precautions when handling tissues, cells, or microbiological specimens owing to the increasing numbers of individuals infected with hepatitis C and HIV in the US and the possibility that an individual may be asymptomatic when a specimen is obtained. Similar precautions must be followed in laboratories that use animal tissues owing to the possibility of exposure to agents that are pathogenic in humans. Personnel with conditions associated with immunosuppression should evaluate carefully whether or not specific laboratory environments put them at increased risk of disease. We offer here some general approaches to identifying biohazards and to minimizing the potential risk of exposure. The issues discussed can be used to develop a general safety program as required by regulatory or accrediting agencies, including the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.

Personnel in medical, veterinary or research laboratories may be exposed to a wide variety of pathogens that range from deadly to debilitating. For some of these pathogens, no treatment is available, and in other cases the treatment does not fully control the disease. It is important that personnel in laboratories that process human or microbiological specimens follow universal precautions when handling tissues, cells, or microbiological specimens owing to the increasing numbers of individuals infected with hepatitis C and HIV in the US and the possibility that an individual may be asymptomatic when a specimen is obtained. Similar precautions must be followed in laboratories that use animal tissues owing to the possibility of exposure to agents that are pathogenic in humans. Personnel with conditions associated with immunosuppression should evaluate carefully whether or not specific laboratory environments put them at increased risk of disease. We offer here some general approaches to identifying biohazards and to minimizing the potential risk of exposure. The issues discussed can be used to develop a general safety program as required by regulatory or accrediting agencies, including the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.

With the advent of the Fourth Revolution, military weapon systems are also being advanced. In particular, as the proportion of software embedded in these weapon systems increases, the cyber vulnerabilities of advanced weapon systems also gradually increase. If cutting-edge weapons stop abruptly or malfunction owing to software defects or cyberattacks, they will adversely affect defense security as well as combat power and economic losses. The U.S. DoD is implementing the risk management framework (RMF) to cope with cyber vulnerabilities and threats. RMF is a risk management (RM)-based framework that classifies the cyber vulnerabilities of weapon systems based on data and evaluates them according to confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The application of RMF to the Korean military's weapon-system acquisition procedure is still in its infancy. In this study, we studied the application of the RMF to weapon acquisition processors in the U.S. DoD and suggested that measures of availability, reliability, and safety that can affect weapon performance should be managed with security, and that security systems should be applied to reliability, availability, and maintenance (RAM).

The Defense Panel includes three members from the Military Departments who are involved in Defense Human Factors science and technology programs at three management levels. Each will present a brief discussion of the current and projected human factors problems related to weapon systems development and operation and and will also discuss the research and development efforts to address these problems. First, Mr. Gary Morton, Director of Navy Laboratories, Navy Material Command, will discuss Navy human factors problems and programs from a broad Navy Laboratories point-of-view. As Commander of the Aerospace Medical Division, Major General John W. Ord (USAF, MC) brings the perspective of the manager of all human factors research and development for the Air Force. Dr. Edgar M. Johnson, Technical Director, Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) will present the Army's human factors needs and ARI's science and technology programs which focus on these needs. The objective of the Defense Panel is to provide a forum in which current and future problems in military systems are discussed. The human factors science and technology programs to solve the problems will also be discussed. During the past decade, the Department of Defense weapons system development process has been modified to more effectively include human factors considerations throughout the entire spectrum of the weapon system development and employment. Most current and projected military weapon systems have a significant human operator component. This human operator component requires consideration of a wide variety of issues: protective systems, human performance capabilities, personnel skills/quality, training, personnel manning and related costs considerations, performance measurement, human/machine interface (especially computer), decision making and military organizational factors. Also the more traditional human factors problems such as displays and controls, task allocations and operator station design require consideraton. A major issue that the Panel will consider concerns the human factors of the engineering process and how human factors science and technology can impact this process. Examples of current and future weapon systems problems and the science and technology initiatives to solve these problems will be discussed.

The combat capability of the weaponry system reflects the overall characteristics of the weapon system. It is a non-linear and cooperative complex system. First of all, we study the characteristic mechanism of weapon and equipment system synergy and propose the basic idea of exploratory synergy modeling. According to the exploratory idea, we model the hierarchical structure of the equipment system, abstract the main unit of combat capability, give the method of quantifying the underlying data based on the mean method, and briefly introduce the regression calculation method of partial least squares method to determine the relationship between the main bodies.

A METHODOLOGY FOR WEAPON SYSTEM AVAILABILITY ASSESSMENT, INCORPORATING FAILURE, DAMAGE AND REGENERATION

Today, most every weapon system is electronics intensive. Digital computers are at the core of military aircraft, ship, and vehicle weapons systems. Indeed, each weapon system's performance is largely determined by its digital computers and other electronics. This electronics dependency is necessary in order to provide the speed, functional compliance, and accuracy to achieve the required weapon system performance. Historically, test systems required for the various maintenance levels and also at the manufacturing site have each been uniquely developed, employed, and sustained for only one area of weapon system electronics support. There are a number of reasons for this situation including different organizations responsible for the levels of support, different funding sources, timing limitations, and technical feasibility. In recent years, however, commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) advances in measurement and stimulation hardware, personal computers, Windows operating systems, flexible test programming languages, and more, have made it technically feasible to develop a family of test systems that provide common weapon system electronics support at all levels. Some use the phrase Vertical Test Integration to describe this concept of factory/field/depot integration.

“Defense at the Speed of Light” has been the decades long motto for laser w eapons. High -energy lasers have undergone forty years of development and testing and are positioned to provide very real enhancements to military capabilities from tactical to strategic operations , yet there are virtually no truly high power laser weapons systems in the Department of Defense inventory . Remarkable progress has been made since the first invention of the solid state laser in the 1960s through gas dynamic, chemical, free electron and advanced solid state lasers pushing today’s state -of -the -ar t. Technology has been advanced through laboratory science and many integration and demonstration programs from the Baseline Demonstration Laser (BDL - 1973), the Navy -ARPA Chemical Laser (NACL - 1978), the Airborne Laser Laboratory (ALL ; 1972 - 1983), th e Mid -Infrared Chemical Laser (MIRACL) program (1980) , the Alpha Space Laser (SBL) program, the ground based Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) program, up to the current Airborne Laser (ABL) and the Airborne Tactical Laser (ATL) programs. The fundamentals of the physics of laser weapons systems are well understood and provide a background for decision criteria in laser beam production, beam quality, beam stabilization and wavefront control, and dwell time on target for lethality. The technical fundamental s necessary for fielding a complete weapons system, which is more than just the laser beam power generator or beam director and control syste m, are sufficiently mature . Critical technical issues in beam generation, beam control, target acquisition, tracki ng and pointing, atmospheric propagation, thermal management, lethality and kill assessment have been addressed and incorporated into decision making engineering design, eng agement and architecture models, such as Raytheon’s DEWSEM TM (Directed Energy Weapo n System Effectiveness Model) and the HELEEOS model (High Energy Laser End -to -End Operational Simulation) developed by the AFIT Center for Directed Energy. However, technology and doctrine have not come together to make HEL weapon systems compelling choic es for field commanders to enthusiastically embrace DEW. The full impact of all of the “ilities” of HEL weapons systems, including thermal and other waste management, life -cycle costs, as well as employment doctrine must progress along with technologica l evoluti on to achieve both the necessar y and sufficient conditions for DEW to take their place in our military inventory. Throughout the history of military weapons systems , that has only been accomplished on the battlefield, not in scientific laboratori es.

The Versatile Automated Depot Test Station (VDATS) is a major component in solving the U.S. Air Forcepsilas Automatic Test System (ATS) proliferation concerns. VDATS addresses the proliferation issue by providing the capability to replace an estimated 260 depot-level test systems that assume 150 different configurations, as well as a large number of intermediate-level test systems.The Department of Defense (DoD) has invested billions of dollars in aging and increasingly obsolete ATS used to troubleshoot and diagnose components of military aircraft and weapon systems. The issues of increased downtimes, test system obsolescence, and nonportable Test Program Sets (TPS) further contributes to the DoD's continued reporting of spare parts shortages and the increasing impacts that ATS obsolescence has on the readiness of military aircraft and weapon systems. The VDATS provides a viable approach to resolving these issues. VDATS has an extensible designed-in expansion capability intended to support present and future Air Force workloads by providing an organically-developed ATS platform with a modular, open-systems architecture that is Flexible, Capable, Tailorable, and Sustainable. VDATS makes it technically feasible to now realize the laudable 1994 DoD policy goal stated in: Military Readiness: DoD Needs to Better Manage Automatic Test Equipment Modernization," GAO-03-451, March 2003.[1] VDATS meets this stated DoD policy goal of producing an ATS capable of supporting multiple weapon systems, aircraft, and eventually being interoperable between DoD services. In 2007 the Air Force's VDATS was officially designated as a DoD Standard Family of Testers, supporting the 2005 ATS Master Plan requirement meant to reduce ATS proliferation and life-cycle operations and support costs. This paper briefly examines the present-day issues and how the U.S. Air Force is resolving these with the VDATS program. It also explains the strategy to preserve present-day and near-future TPS re- host investments, while enhancing system capabilities to meet the Air Force's depot and intermediate-level ATS requirements for the foreseeable future.

Emerging SEM equipment system combat capability assessment method