Methods of Solving the Theoretic Game Models for Coordinating Interests in Regulating the Fishery Industry

Abstract

Dynamic theoretic game models for the coordination of private and social interests of agents in the concept of the sustainable development (SD) of the dynamic system controlled by them are investigated. Within this concept, the hierarchical control mechanisms—methods of administrative control and inducement—are formalized as solutions of hierarchical differential games with the phase constraints reflecting the requirements for the state of the controlled dynamic system providing the conditions for SD. Administrative control involves the impact of the leading player (the subject of managing SD) on the set of admissible controls for the followers (the subject of the impact on the controlled dynamic system); and the incentive, on his payoff function. Mechanisms of administrative and economic management are formalized as computer imitation scenarios. The dynamic models considered in the article are the development of the models for the coordination of private and social interests proposed by Yu.B. Germeyer and I.A. Vatel. Numerical calculations are carried out and a comparative analysis of the effectiveness of these control mechanisms for the fisheries’ model is fulfilled.