Methodology Without Metaphysics? A Pragmatic Critique

Abstract

Upon browsing recent philosophical literature, on virtually any topic, it is not infrequently that one finds the following kind of caveat: is a principle, not an ontological [or metaphysical] doctrine. The purpose of this essay is to examine and compare some interesting varieties of such philosophical views (methodologicist views, as I will call them), in order to locate some of their relevant similarities and differences, and to offer a pragmatic, metaphilosophical critique of any principled dichotomy between methodology and metaphysics.1 In fact, I see the rejection of the methodology vs. metaphysics dualism as one of the most lasting achievements of pragmatist thought, albeit something that has up to now been insufficiently explored by mainstream (analytic) philosophers. Here, I want to argue, non-pragmatists can learn a great deal from pragmatism, even without turning into pragmatism themselves. While pragmatists have often vigorously argued against assumptions, such as metaphysical realism2 (to which we will have a reason to briefly return in what follows), I shall draw attention to the other side of the coin, the over-emphasis on (and/or epistemological) commitments at the cost of ones-and I shall argue that these are indeed two sides of the same coin. True, the point that any methodology presupposes metaphysics has been made by many, many philosophers (some of whom I shall cite below) in a variety of different contexts, and this point can surely be made without invoking pragmatism at all. I am convinced, however, that a pragmatic approach will help us in appreciating the full force of the metaphysics/methodology entanglement. I can, of course, only provide some selected examples highlighting the theme of my article; it is by no means my purpose to evaluate all uses of the term methodological as a qualifier of a philosophical position. But we will find an interesting variety in views qualified in such a manner already on the basis of my limited material. More metaphilosophically, we shall see that pragmatism itself is best characterized both as a method (of making ideas clear, as its founder put it in the title of one of his most famous papers)3 and as a metaphysics, or rather a philosophical anthropology, a view of human beings as active, goal-oriented creatures involved in their various projects and practices.4 This characterization will bring pragmatism into a close contact with Kantian-inspired transcendental philosophy (suitably reinterpreted), as we shall also perceive in this essay. Merely Methodological Views: Some Varieties The following catalogue, based on a simple search from the Philosopher's Index, will merely serve as a menu of examples of the tendency among contemporary philosophers (and some other theoreticians) to distinguish between and ontological issues and to give priority to the former by bracketing, if not entirely abandoning, the latter. My list is by no means intended as exhaustive, but it gives an idea of the extreme variability of the metaphysics vs. methodology dichotomy. Instead of explicating any of the different views to be mentioned in any detail, I shall in this section simply refer the reader to a whole bunch of relatively recent literature in which methodologicist positions are either formulated or attacked.5 1. Methodologicalsolipsism has for decades, if not for centuries, been an influential position in the philosophy of mind and psychology. Introduced by Rudolf Carnap in 1928 in Der Logische Aufbau der Welt, it goes historically back to Descartes, at least, and has been explicitly formulated in more recent discussions by Jerry Fodor.6 This view says, in brief, that when studying human cognition or concept-formation, we should begin from within the individual thinker, from what is internal to her/his mind. This is the famous strategy adopted by Descartes in his doubt, and essentially the same autopsychological basis for the construction of concepts is proposed by Carnap in the Aufbau. …