Methodological Signatures in Early Ethology: The Problem of Animal Subjectivity

Abstract

What is the adequate terminology to talk about animal behaviour? Is terminology referring to mental or emotional states anthropomorphic and should therefore be prohibited or is it a necessary means to provide for an adequate description and should be encouraged? This question was vehemently discussed in the founding phase of Ethology as a scientific discipline and still is. This multi-layered problem can be grasped by using the concept of methodological signatures, developed by Köchy et al. (2016c). It is designed to analyse and systematically compare animal research approaches by examining their common parameters. By examining the works of Konrad Lorenz (1903–1989) and Nikolaas Tinbergen (1907–1988), this paper offers new insights both on a methodological and theoretical level. Methodologically, the application of the concept of methodological signatures is illustrated; theoretically, the principles of Classic Ethology are analysed. My aim is to illustrate how the problem of scientific access to animal subjectivity was addressed in the history of Ethology by analysing statements about animal sentience. For this purpose, I will first outline the general discussion about animal subjectivity and the tension between anthropomorphism and empirical adequacy. I introduce my own theoretical and methodological framework before presenting an analysis of Lorenz’ and Tinbergen’s methodological signatures. Thereby, I show how the question of terminology is deeply embedded in a network of epistemological, methodological and ontological concepts and establish key characteristics in regard to ethological approaches to animal subjectivity. Finally, I shed light on the possibility of using this typology to examine current frameworks of animal welfare research.