Abstract
What is the adequate terminology to talk about animal behaviour? Is terminology referring to mental or emotional states anthropomorphic and should therefore be prohibited or is it a necessary means to provide for an adequate description and should be encouraged? This question was vehemently discussed in the founding phase of Ethology as a scientific discipline and still is. This multi-layered problem can be grasped by using the concept of methodological signatures, developed by Köchy et al. (2016c). It is designed to analyse and systematically compare animal research approaches by examining their common parameters. By examining the works of Konrad Lorenz (1903–1989) and Nikolaas Tinbergen (1907–1988), this paper offers new insights both on a methodological and theoretical level. Methodologically, the application of the concept of methodological signatures is illustrated; theoretically, the principles of Classic Ethology are analysed. My aim is to illustrate how the problem of scientific access to animal subjectivity was addressed in the history of Ethology by analysing statements about animal sentience. For this purpose, I will first outline the general discussion about animal subjectivity and the tension between anthropomorphism and empirical adequacy. I introduce my own theoretical and methodological framework before presenting an analysis of Lorenz’ and Tinbergen’s methodological signatures. Thereby, I show how the question of terminology is deeply embedded in a network of epistemological, methodological and ontological concepts and establish key characteristics in regard to ethological approaches to animal subjectivity. Finally, I shed light on the possibility of using this typology to examine current frameworks of animal welfare research.
Highlights
IntroductionBehavioural research has been confronted with the question of the methodological, terminological and ontological problem of other minds in the investigation of non-human animals (hereafter referred to as animals) (Böhnert and Hilbert 2018, 4–7)
Since its beginning, behavioural research has been confronted with the question of the methodological, terminological and ontological problem of other minds1 in the investigation of non-human animals (Böhnert and Hilbert 2018, 4–7)
Regarding the application of this key characteristics to research approaches, the semantic content of the concept of subjective terminology must be considered in terms of differentiation and range: Is subjectivity characterised broadly as experience or does it refer to emotion, cognition or even specific experiences like boredom or surprise? And, if subjective terminology is rejected, does this mean all kinds of terms or just a subset?
Summary
Behavioural research has been confronted with the question of the methodological, terminological and ontological problem of other minds in the investigation of non-human animals (hereafter referred to as animals) (Böhnert and Hilbert 2018, 4–7). Descartes’ mind–body-dualism and his thesis that animals (in contrast to humans) are machines are regarded as central components of a narrative in animal research according to which animals are mere corporeal beings without any sentience (Schmitz 2014, 34; Wild 2013, 44–53; Toepfer 2011, 494) This strong form of anthropological difference was difficult to maintain in its original form due to the notion of phylogenetic kinship in the theory of evolution. This paper portrays how the problem of scientific access to animal subjectivity was addressed in the early history of Ethology by analysing selected research approaches in which the (de)legitimisation for the use of subjective terminology is discussed. By application of the key characteristics of Classical Ethology to a fairly new method in animal welfare research called Qualitative Behaviour Assessment, I will show both the applicability of the developed framework as well as shed light on possible modifications to animal behaviour research in the 21st century
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