Methodological consequences of weak embodied cognition and shared intentionality

Abstract

Abstract Embodied approaches to cognition have been empirically successful both in developmental psychology and robotics. Shared intentionality has been similarly productive in developmental and comparative psychology. However, embodiment and shared intentionality both have a rich philosophical history. As a consequence, researchers who aim to benefit from the methodological advances of these literature must navigate through a variety of different usages, many of which rest on potentially contentious philosophies regarding the nature of mind. We attempt to identify renditions of embodiment and shared intentionality that can motivate research while making relatively modest assumptions. As we will see, such readings already exist in the embodied cognition literature. We find most uses of shared intentionality, however, to be unnecessarily strong theses that inevitably tie a researcher to contentious frameworks. We suggest a usage-based explication of shared intentionality that is far weaker, and may motivate research in the absence of such assumptions.