Abstract
The purpose of the article is to present selected method of risk assessment of railway control and signaling systems, including current normative and legal bases, such as directives and regulations that regulate the interoperability and safety of the railway system. Selected methods used at the initial stage of creating safety requirements and referring to the initial definition of the system defined at a high level of abstraction are considered. Issues of holistic approach and residual risk management are also discussed. Risk models are presented as well as individual steps of risk analysis, evaluation, and assessment, including hazard identification, impact analysis, and selection of the risk acceptance principle. Selected model based on hazard and operability studies (HAZOP) and an adapted risk graph was applied to the real signalling equipment. The key aspect undertaken in the article is the proposal to set quantitative safety objectives based on the safety integrity level/tolerable hazard rate (SIL/THR) indicator, as an important parameter in further analysis of the system, especially in computer applications. The result of study showed that application of proposed combination HAZOP and adapted risk graph method are efficient and suitable for a railway signalling application. The results and conclusion are presented in Chapters 4 and 6 of the article.
Highlights
The most vulnerable part of any system, including railway signalling systems, is human
The article presents a general description of the risk assessment process and the consequences of setting safety requirements
Explicit risk estimation methods were presented, based on the methods used to meet the safety targets in binding standards and norms dedicated for railway signalling systems
Summary
The most vulnerable part of any system, including railway signalling systems, is human. The purpose of the article is to present selected method of risk assessment of railway control and signaling systems, including current normative and legal bases, such as directives and regulations that regulate the interoperability and safety of the railway system. These problems differ because the devices and systems vary significantly. The goal of the article was to present the hazard and operability studies (HAZOP) and adapted risk graph method to perform initial risk assessment process and determine safety integrity level/tolerable hazard rate (SIL/THR) requirement and as well to meet the requirements of railway regulation especially regulation 402/2013 [9,10,11]. The notations and abbreviations can be found in Appendix A, Table A2
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
