Abstract
Recent years have seen a Bayesian revolution in cognitive science. In this paper, I work out the implications of this revolution for the metaphysics of mind. My central claim is that the Bayesian approach supports a novel empirical argument for normativism, the thesis that belief has a rational normative essence. The argument I develop draws in part on the causal powers subset account of realization, with the connection being that Bayesians often appeal to Marr's framework of levels of analysis, which carries with it multiple realizability claims that can be understood in terms of the subset model.
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