Abstract
AbstractFrege is celebrated as an arch-Platonist and an arch-realist. He is renowned for claiming that truths of arithmetic are eternally true and independent of us, our judgments, and our thought; that there is a “third realm” containing nonphysical objects that are not ideas. In this chapter it is argued that, to sustain the view that Frege means these renowned claims as statements of metaphysical doctrines, it is necessary to reject most of his claims about the unsaturatedness of functions. It is widely believed that these claims should be rejected, since they give rise to apparently insuperable problems. In this chapter, however, it is argued that the problems result, not from Frege’s claims about unsaturatedness but, rather, the view that they are meant to form part of a metaphysical theory. Properly understood, Frege has no problem with the concept horse.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callSimilar Papers
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
