Abstract
I argue that 1050a30—b3 contains an argument in which a series of analogies treating the ‘in’ relation are deployed to constrain how the relation between life and the soul is to be construed, such that, given other reasonable premises, it follows that the soul is identical with the activity life. The interpretation of the ‘in’ relation turns crucially upon the distinction between a subject and a site for an activity, which opens the way for understanding the relation designated as not being that of inherence, which would imply some form of ontological distinction. After establishing the conclusion concerning identity, I explain how the soul may be understood as possessing a modally graded internal structure, each higher-order modality corresponding to a higher level of completion, thinking being the highest grade in human beings. I then show how the identity of soul and living activities affirmed at b2—3 implies the substantial priority of energeia to potentiality affirmed at b3—4.
Highlights
In a neglected and even somewhat abused passage at Metaphysics, 9.8, 1050a30—b3, in which Aristotle is concerned with demonstrating that energeia1 is prior in ‘substance’ to potentiality, he connects the soul with ‘energeia’ via the concepts of substance and form.2 The passage itself, in which he is contrasting two types of energeia, is as follows: For so many things for which there is something other coming to be apart from the activity [χρῆσιν] – for those the energeia is in the thing being produced; for example, building is in the thing being built and weaving in the thing being woven, and in the other cases, and generally the change is in the thing being moved [ὲν τῷ κινουμένῳ]
The identity thesis is of special interest and deserves special emphasis as it concerns what Aristotle had in Book 7 called primary substance in living things, namely, soul and form
1050a4—1051a2 form a continuous treatment of the priority in substance in energeia, but I can largely restrict my attention to the first half of that treatment concluding in 1050b5, as the identity thesis falls towards the end of it and is not repeated in the second half
Summary
In a neglected and even somewhat abused passage at Metaphysics, 9.8, 1050a30—b3, in which Aristotle is concerned with demonstrating that energeia1 is prior in ‘substance’ to potentiality, he connects the soul with ‘energeia’ via the concepts of substance and form.2 The passage itself, in which he is contrasting two types of energeia, is as follows: For so many things for which there is something other coming to be apart from the activity [χρῆσιν] – for those the energeia is in the thing being produced; for example, building is in the thing being built and weaving in the thing being woven, and in the other cases, and generally the change is in the thing being moved [ὲν τῷ κινουμένῳ]. The thesis here to be defended consists of two parts: first, that this connection is best understood as an identity between soul (the form of living things) and the energeia of biological activity and, second, that the preceding context from 1050a30 is best understood as an argument for this conclusion.
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