Abstract
One argument for Scientific Realism is from the success of science. But it is not clear whether this argument supports Metaphysical Realism with respect to the entities of science, or merely some weaker form of Realism such as Hilary Putnam’s ‘Internal Realism’.1 In this paper it will be argued that if the argument supports any form of Realism, it supports Metaphysical Realism. More specifically, it will be argued that if some notion of truth is needed to explain the success of science, then that notion of truth must be a non-epistemic, Realist notion.KeywordsIdeal TheoryRepeatable EffectRealist SenseTrue PropositionSuccessful TheoryThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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