Abstract
This chapter argues that there can be coincident entities, numerically different things, having different persistence conditions, that are composed of exactly the same micro-entities. This means that the higher-order properties of such entities do not supervene on, and are not realized by, the ‘thin’ physical properties that are shared by the coincident entities. They are realized by ‘thick’ physical properties, ones individuated by the persistence conditions of the things that have them. The nature of the causal profiles of properties is argued to be incompatible with the four-dimensionalist, perdurance account of the nature of persisting entities. It is argued that these causal profiles provide a basis for saying what it is for a set of microentities to make up a single object.
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