Abstract
This article argues that familiar metaphors are associated with the mental lexicon, where they are easily accessed. Metaphorical senses could simply be added to the lexicon, as idioms, or combined with literal senses by abstraction. These approaches do not, as Lakoff and Johnson (1980) pointed out, account for systematicity. One can not only "grasp lectures," but "manipulate beliefs," "toss theories around," and "juggle formulas." A third possible strategy is sense extension, where rules derive a figurative sense by considering the violated literal constraints. The experiment reported here investigated such familiar and systematic metaphors, comparing the time to recognize words used in systematic metaphors as opposed to literal and anomalous control sentences. The results suggest a stage model of processing, in which the second, failure-driven stage is obligatory: If processing using literal senses (including any senses that have been lexicalized by idiom addition or abstraction) fails, then automatically check for any applicable sense extension rules. Finally, a computational model of the various strategies for lexicalization is briefly described.
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