Abstract
In order to solve the Frege-Geach problem, most proponents of metaethical expressivism accept deflationary concept of truth. Yet, Paul Boghossian and Ronald Dworkin argue that those two theories are incompatible because deflationism subverts expressivism by making it too easy for ethical sentences to be truth-apt. Taking the tension between expressivism and deflationism to be the indicator of their conflict in theoretical motivations - revisionist and antirevisionist - I will try to show that they indeed are incompatible, but not for reasons that Boghossian and Dworkin point out. Namely, although expressivist can use deflationism to globalise his view on the whole of language, motivational conflict breaks out anew in an unexpected way - once deflationism and expressivism are fully integrated, expressivist is no longer able to explain what sets him apart from methaethical realist.
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