Abstract
Congenial information is often judged to be more valid than uncongenial (but otherwise equivalent) information. The present research explores a related possibility concerning the process by which people label a claim as fundamentally factual (open to proof or disproof) or opinion (a matter of personal preference not amenable to falsification). Rather than merely being more skeptical of uncongenial claims, uncongenial claims may be metacognitively categorized as more opinion than factual, while congenial claims may be more likely to be categorized as factual. The two studies reported here attempt to trace a preliminary outline of how claims are categorized as fact, opinion, or some mix of the two in the context of mundane claims, contentious political issues, and conspiracy theories. The findings suggest that claims are more likely to be labeled factual (and, to a lesser extent, are less likely to be labeled opinion) to the extent that one subjectively agrees with the content of the claim. Conspiracy theories appear to occupy a middle-ground between fact and opinion. This metacognitive approach may help shed light on popular debate about conspiracy theories, as well as seemingly intractable political disagreements more generally, which may reflect fundamental differences in the perceived epistemic foundations of claims rather than simple disagreement over the facts of the matter. Given limitations of the stimuli and participant samples, however, it remains to be seen how generalizable these findings are.
Highlights
“I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith.” —Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1781
How does one determine whether a claim one encounters—or a belief of one’s own—is factual knowledge, personal opinion, or an article of faith? The current research attempts to trace a preliminary outline of this metacognitive belief-categorization process in the context of mundane claims, contentious political issues, and conspiracy theories
The sample leaned toward liberal ideology; 40% said they identified as a “Strong liberal,” 38% as a “Moderate liberal,”
Summary
“I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith.” —Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1781. Opinions are judged to be more biologically-based while factual beliefs are seen as learned (Heiphetz et al, 2017) Religious claims, such as “God answers prayers,” appear to occupy a middle-ground between fact and opinion, intermediate in terms of their perceived basis in biology, openness to disagreement, and providing information both about the world and about the characteristics of the speaker (Heiphetz et al, 2013, 2014, 2017; see Van Leeuwen, 2014; Levy, 2017). Such research supports the distinction between modes of belief articulated by Kant (1781), and raises questions about how individuals categorize statements as factual, opinion, or a matter of faith. Our metacognition faculties allow us to discriminate between what we know and do not know (Metcalfe and Son, 2012; Kornell and Finn, 2016), what we can learn and what may be impossible to learn (Son and Sethi, 2010; Bae et al, 2020), what is real and what is imagined (Buda et al, 2011; Dehaene et al, 2017), and in the current examination, what is fact and what is opinion
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