Meta‐Reasoning and Practical Deliberation

Abstract

Fallibilism about our practical judgments is uncontroversial: we are frequently wrong when we make decisions about what to do often badly wrong and everyone knows it. But efforts to characterize and respond to our lamentably imperfect decision-making have lagged. There has been some work in related fields. A few philosophers have tackled our uncertainty about moral principles and the norms that apply in virtue of that uncertainty, or argued that some moral views are better hedges against our fallibility than others.1 In a related vein, there has been discussion of how to respond to evidence of our fallibility emanating from empirical psychology and disagreement among peers.2 But despite this progress toward taking our fallibility as practical (and epistemic) agents seriously, much more work remains to be done, and my aim here is to contribute to this task. In particular, sometimes there is evidence about what we would decide to do from an improved deliberative position one in which we have better information, say, or are subject to less bias, or are able to consider the relevant facts with greater vividness. I argue that in such situations we should act on that evidence, and that there are some important ethical and prudential applications for this idea. Following through with this suggestion allows us to respond to the fact that we are prone to error by making the appropriate