Abstract
Abstract What determines the meaning of a context-sensitive expression in a context? It is standardly assumed that, for a given expression type, there will be a unitary answer to this question; most of the literature on the subject involves arguments designed to show that one particular metasemantic proposal is superior to a specific set of alternatives. The task of the present essay will be to explore whether this is a warranted assumption, or whether the quest for the one true metasemantics might be a Quixotic one. We argue that there are good reasons—much better than are commonly appreciated—for thinking the latter, but that there nevertheless remains significant scope for metasemantic theorizing. We conclude by outlining our preferred option, metasemantic pluralism.
Highlights
What determines the meaning of a context-sensitive expression in a context? Most philosophers have assumed that there will be a unitary answer to this question.1 Some have allowed that there might be different answers for different expressions.2 Few have considered the possibility that one and the same expression might not admit a single answer.3 Our aim here will be to showC The Author 2021
We worry that many debates in metasemantics appear to be driven by the tacit assumption that there must be a unitary answer to the question: ‘What determines the semantic value of an expression in a context?’ We argue that dropping this assumption opens up space for a range of views, which we call metasemantic pluralism, that have been almost entirely overlooked in the literature
In order to make it feasible to address these topics in the course of a single essay, we focus our discussion primarily on metasemantic proposals pertaining to the simple demonstratives ‘this’ and ‘that’
Summary
What determines the meaning of a context-sensitive expression in a context? Most philosophers have assumed that there will be a unitary answer to this question. Some have allowed that there might be different answers for different expressions. Few have considered the possibility that one and the same expression might not admit a single answer. Our aim here will be to show. We worry that many debates in metasemantics appear to be driven by the tacit assumption that there must be a unitary answer to the question: ‘What determines the semantic value of an expression in a context?’ We argue that dropping this assumption opens up space for a range of views, which we call metasemantic pluralism, that have been almost entirely overlooked in the literature.. There is much more to be said in favour of such views than one might have anticipated One advantage they offer is that one need no longer engage in arguments about which cases are the ‘central’ ones simpliciter; rather, one can allow for centrality to vary relative to the question that one is interested in answering. At the end of the paper, we return to the question of whether the conclusions we draw for the metasemantics of demonstratives can be extended to other context-sensitive terms as well.
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