Abstract
There are many different ways to regulate water utilities. By focusing almost exclusively on regulatory agencies, the literature has missed important alternatives regarding the mechanisms through which the general rules of the game, defined at the macro-institutional level, interact with operators organizing transactions at the micro-level. Building on recent developments in organization theory and on the distinction between property rights and decision rights, this paper explores the variety of arrangements, identified as ‘meso-institutions,’ providing these links. The analysis is substantiated through a comparative approach to the drinkable water systems in France, England and Whales, and the Netherlands.
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