Abstract
Study of the formation and subsequent behavior of the companies’ coalitions are becoming increasingly important in today's economy. In the elementary case, the process of collaboration may be represented as a classical cooperative game with transferable utility. However, the assumption of the possibility of describing the potential winnings of coalitions using deterministic values seems very controversial. Hypothesis of their random nature is much more realistic. The paper presents the conversion from classical cooperative game theory with side-payments to stochastic analog. Game theory modeling of mergers and acquisitions processes is based on this class of games here.
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