Abstract

We analyse merger profitability in a mixed-oligopoy Cournot model. The “merger paradox” is qualified by showing that there are profitable gains for the firms participating in a horizontal merger that is not a merger to a monopoly. In particular, it is shown that merger sustainability depends on both, the privatization degree of the mixed firm and the number of non-merging firms.

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