Abstract
Each stage of merger analysis involves predictions about uncertain events. The quality of merger enforcement and its ability to improve consumer welfare depend heavily on how well the federal antitrust agencies cope with such uncertainty. The agencies and the courts have to date adopted an approach to uncertainty that runs a substantial risk of allowing harmful mergers and of blocking beneficial transactions. This article examines how decision theory could be applied to the analysis of uncertainty in reviewing mergers, thereby improving antitrust enforcement and its impacts on consumer welfare.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
