Abstract

The conclusion of the McKinsey paradox is that certain contingent claims about the external world are knowable a priori. Almost all of the literature on the paradox assumes that this conclusion is unacceptable, and focuses on finding a way of avoiding it. However, there is no consensus that any of these responses work. In this paper I take a different approach, arguing that the conclusion is acceptable. First, I develop our understanding of what Evans calls merely superficially contingent a priori knowledge, and explain why there is no reason to deny that merely superficially contingent a priori knowledge of the external world is possible. I then argue that, properly understood, the conclusion of the McKinsey paradox is that merely superficially contingent knowledge of certain claims about the external world is possible, and so the conclusion is acceptable. Finally, I respond to the two main arguments that the conclusion of the paradox is unacceptable.

Highlights

  • 38 Page 2 of 15Synthese (2022) 200:38 access, according to which we sometimes have a priori knowledge of what we are thinking. Each of these ideas is independently plausible, at least upon suitable refinement

  • The McKinsey paradox is driven by two ideas.1 The first is externalism about thought content, the view that some facts about mental content do not supervene on the facts about the intrinsic properties of the subject

  • The impression that the conclusion of the paradox does refute vat scepticism stems from the mistaken idea that it implies that I have deeply contingent a priori knowledge that I am in a water environment, in which case there would be no reason to suppose that my knowledge that I am in a water environment is APII

Read more

Summary

38 Page 2 of 15

Synthese (2022) 200:38 access, according to which we sometimes have a priori knowledge of what we are thinking. Each of these ideas is independently plausible, at least upon suitable refinement. Two such reasons have been offered in the literature: it has been suggested that the conclusion offers too quick a response to scepticism, and it has been suggested that the conclusion is counterintuitive These arguments depend on the implicit assumption that the conclusion of the paradox is that it is possible for a subject to have deeply contingent a prioriknowledge—a priori knowledge of a thought that is contingent and not semantically guaranteed—of certain claims about the external world. This assumption is false, so both arguments fail

The paradox
38 Page 4 of 15
Merely superficially contingent a priori knowledge
38 Page 6 of 15
38 Page 8 of 15
Solving the paradox
38 Page 10 of 15
Why not?
38 Page 12 of 15
38 Page 14 of 15
Conclusion
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call