Abstract
Studies have shown that during social interaction a shared system underlies inferring one’s own mental state, and the mental states of others – processes often referred to as mentalization. However, no validated assessment has been developed to measure second order mentalization (one’s beliefs about how transparent one’s thoughts are to others), or whether this capacity plays a significant role in social interaction. The current work presents a interactive mentalization theory, which divides these directional and second order aspects of mentalization, and investigates whether these constructs are measurable, stable, and meaningful in social interactions. We developed a 20-item, self-report interactive mentalization questionnaire (IMQ) in order to assess the different sub-components of mentalization: self–self, self–other, and other–self mentalization (Study 1). We then tested this scale on a large, online sample, and report convergent and discriminant validity in the form of correlations with other measures (Study 2), as well as correlations with social deception behaviors in real online interaction with Mturk studies (Study 3 and Study 4). These results validate the IMQ, and support the idea that these three factors can predict mentalization in social interaction.
Highlights
Humans have a rich capacity to infer the mental states and thoughts of others, possess the ability to look inward to self-monitor and assess thought processes, and can make inferences about how much other agents have insight into their own thought processes
The Autism Spectrum Quotient (ASQ) score was strongly negatively correlated with three IMQ subscales, r = –0.31, p < 0.001 for IMQ_OS, r = –0.42, p < 0.001 for IMQ_SS, r = –0.19, p < 0.01 for IMQ_SO
IMQ_OS scores were significantly higher for responders who rejected the offer (M = 17.92, SD = 4.20) than those who accepted the offer [M = 16.15, SD = 3.34; t(47) = 6.50, p = 0.007, Cohen’s d = 0.43, 95% CI = –1.69 to 1.84], suggesting that higher meta-mentalization capacity was associated with an increase in rejections
Summary
Humans have a rich capacity to infer the mental states and thoughts of others (i.e., self–other mentalization), possess the ability to look inward to self-monitor and assess thought processes (i.e., self–self mentalization; i.e., metacognition), and can make inferences about how much other agents have insight into their own thought processes (i.e., other–self mentalization) These mentalizing processes are important in navigating a variety of social environments and building successfully relationships. Meta-cognition refers to our second order thoughts, that is, perceptions and beliefs about our own cognitive processes (Flavell, 1979; Nelson and Narens, 1990). This includes knowledge of our own beliefs, awareness of mental-states, and estimates of confidence in our abilities across different. To complement meta-cognition about one’s own cognitive processes, inferring the cognitive states of other individuals comes to bear in social contexts, and this has been referred to as mentalization (Frith and Frith, 2005)
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