Mental Simulation, Tacit Theory, and the Threat of Collapse

Abstract

According to the theory theory of folk psychology, our engagement in the folk psychological practices of prediction, interpretation and explanation draws on a rich body of knowledge about psychological matters. According to the simulation theory, in contrast, a fundamental role is played by our ability to identify with another person in imagination and to replicate or re-enact aspects of the other person’s mental life. But on each side of the theory versus simulation debate there are significant differences of approach. On the theory-theory side, some use the term ‘theory’ in a narrow sense to require that the body of knowledge about psychological matters should be organised around generalisations that have the status of psychological laws. Others use the term in a more inclusive sense to encompass any body of information or misinformatio n about psychology. Some theory theorists say that the theory is learned, either by processes analogous to scientific investigation or else by cultural transmission. Others say that the theory is, to a considerable extent, innate. On the simulation-theory side, some think of mental simulation as restricted to the re-enactment of rational transitions in thought. Others contrast the simulation approach with accounts of mental-state attribution that make use of an assumption of rationality. Some abstract away from questions about cognitive machinery and describe simulation in personal-leve l folk psychological terms. Others regard the simulation theory as a contribution to cognitive science. 1