Abstract
Under reformed commitment legislation, mental illness alone is insufficient grounds for mental hospitalization. Nonetheless, judges of involuntary commitment hearings operate under the working assumption that persons sought to be committed are mentally ill, and this assumption shapes all other aspects of their evaluations. This article treats the mental illness assumption as an experiental reality and explores the ways in which the assumption influences judges' assessments of candidate patients' courtroom demeanor, testimony, and behavior. It examines the assumption's effect on judges' evaluations of the tenability of these persons' proposed community living arrangements and suggests that contemporary commitment practices tend to enforce a sort of “community custody” upon those persons who avoid commitment.
Published Version
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