Mencius, Hume, and Sensibility Theory

Abstract

In this article I will present and defend sensibility theory, a particular version of naturalistic moral realism, by combining the complementary features of the Mencian and Humean traditions. Moral irrealism stresses subjectivity. Traditional moral realism stresses objectivity. What distinguishes sensibility theory from other metaethical theories is that it harmonizes subjectivity and objectivity on a realist ground. I bring Mencius and David Hume together in defending sensibility theory because this theory derives essential support from the works of both. Mencius (371289 B.C.) is one of the most important Confucians in the classical period of ancient Chinese philosophy. He helped to shape the Chinese philosophical thinking after him for more than two thousand years. Hume (1711-1776) is one of the bestknown Scottish philosophers who even today still greatly influences almost every field of Western philosophy. Mencius and Hume share essential features in their moral theories, yet they are also complementary to each other at other fundamental points.' Mencius insists that moral qualities are as real as secondary qualities. He frequently compares the mind/heart's (xin) enjoyment of moral qualities to the eye's enjoyment of certain colors, the ear's enjoyment of certain sounds, the mouth's enjoyment of certain flavors (Meng Zi 6A4, 6A7, 6A16).2 In this regard (and in many others), Mencius is similar to Hume. Hume says, Vice and virtue ... may be compar'd to sounds, colours, heat and cold (A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 469).3 Secondary qualities contrast with primary qualities. The latter are physical properties such as mass, shape, electrical charge, and the logical constructions of these physical properties. The former are dispositions to produce sensory experiences of certain sorts under certain conditions.