Abstract
AbstractThis chapter further extends the transparency approach to memory, imagination, and thought. The kind of memory that is chiefly treated is episodic memory which, it turns out, is closely connected to the other two topics. Imagery is the key to a transparent epistemology of memory, and also to imagination and thought. That completes the defense of this book’s theory of self-knowledge. The theory needs controversial claims, most notably the idea that knowledge can be obtained by reasoning from inadequate evidence, or from no evidence at all, and that perception and imagery constitutively involve belief. Those controversial claims were backed by independent argument, but are hardly beyond dispute. The ambition has simply been to establish the transparency account as a leading hypothesis, deserving of further examination.
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