Abstract
Russell's theory of memory as acquaintance with the past seems to square uneasily with his definition of acquaintance as the converse of the relation of presentation of an object to a subject. We show how the two views can be made to cohere under a suitable construal of 'presentation', which has the additional appeal of bringing Russell's theory of memory closer to contemporary views on direct reference and object-dependent thinking than is usually acknowledged. The drawback is that memory as acquaintance with the past falls short of fulfilling Russell's requirement that knowledge by acquaintance be discriminating knowledge - a shortcoming shared by contemporary externalist accounts of knowledge from memory.
Highlights
RESUMO A teoria russelliana da memória como contato com o passado parece coadunar-se mal com definição do contato como a conversa da relação de apresentação de um objeto a um sujeito
If we appreciate the point of Russell’s presentation – in the next to last paragraph of ‘On Denoting’ – of the Principle of Acquaintance as a result of the Theory of Descriptions, I think the significance of the criticism is clear: Russellian acquaintance is direct cognitive access to objects, much as Russellian naming is direct reference
I believe the criticism sheds light on both Russell’s hostility to Frege on Sinn and Bedeutung and on his view that the present image of a past object cannot be a memory of the object
Summary
RESUMO A teoria russelliana da memória como contato (acquaintance) com o passado parece coadunar-se mal com definição do contato (acquaintance) como a conversa da relação de apresentação de um objeto a um sujeito.
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