Member PACs as Strategic Actors

Abstract

The past decade has witnessed a great deal of research on the role of Political Action Committees (PACs) in funding congressional campaigns. One subset of PACs that has attracted increasing public scrutiny are those sponsored by members of Congress. During the past few years, these member PACs have grown in number and size. Eight member PACs contributed just over $400,000 in 1978, while in 1986, 42 member PACs contributed $3.8 million. Member PACs are politically controversial: several of the leading proposals for campaign finance reform currently before Congress eliminate such PACs. Despite this controversy, relatively little research has been done on member PACs. Although numerous studies discussed these PACs briefly, and Clyde Wilcox described the contribution behavior of member PACs and campaign committees for the 1984 election cycle, we know little about how the contribution decisions of member PACs change across election cycles.' In this note, we examine the contribution behavior of member PACs in light of the Gary Jacobson and Samuel Kernell strategic actor model.2 We find that member PACs generally behave as strategic actors, but their contribution strategies vary across parties and chambers, reflecting the unique political position and agenda of PAC sponsors.