Melancholy, madness, or malevolence? Jury confusion in insanity cases and a brief for “Guilty but mentally Ill”

Abstract

Put short and sweet, the insanity defense is a misfit in the criminal justice system. The system, after all, is designed to deter crime by encouraging rational persons to choose lawful conduct because of the consequences, it is fundamentally based upon individual culpability for wrongful choices. Conduct that springs from insanity--by definition, conduct which is nat the product of a rational, calculating mind--is not accommodated by such a system, either in theory or practice. Recent years have witnessed significant dissatisfaction, from several quarters, with the insanity defense. Two major problems are commonly acknowledged. In some cases, juries unknowingly facilitate an early return to the streets for dangerous offenders when they are found not guilty by reason of insanity but are quickly thereafter certified as sane by mental health professionals. On the other hand, in cases where an insanity verdict clearly is appropriate, juries are sometimes ignoring -"nullifying" -the insanity defense in order to assure imprisonment of deranged offenders. At the same time, mentally tit offenders who are simply found guilty but not insane are, perhaps, treated less humanely because they are sent to a penitentiary, not a hospital. Is there a solution? No one claims a perfect answer. The concept and structure of our criminal law were intended to deal with willful conduct by rational human beings, not deranged persons. Nonetheless, it is the purpose of this paper to argue that our system could be improved by the addition of an alternative verdict of "Guilty But Mentally IU." First, it would preclude early, inappropriate release of serious offenders by the mental health system. Secondly, it would aid juries in following the law and being true to their oaths. Finally, it would facilitate medical ue.atment for convicts suffering from mental illness.