Meeting Feynman: Bringing light into the black box of social measurement

Thomas Salzberger

doi:10.1088/1742-6596/1065/7/072035

Abstract

The social sciences largely have not achieved successes of the same stature as the natural sciences. This may be due in large part to failures in the theory and practice of measurement. Rather than modelling the mechanism of measurement, which remains a black box, assigned numerals are interpreted as measures. More advanced methods have been available for many years but have been adopted slowly and often been applied inadequately. While some models may indeed shed light on the black box, more elaborate conceptual theories are required also in order to eventually lift social measurement to the level of physical measurement.

Highlights

Measurement in the social sciences and measurement in the natural sciences certainly differ in terms of how measurement is carried out
Humans generally act as observers, while objects interact with measurement instruments directly [1]
While modern physical measurement results in measures expressed in traceable units associated with an estimate of uncertainty as the two key elements of metrology, the situation in social measurement is different

Summary

Introduction

Measurement in the social sciences (social measurement) and measurement in the natural sciences (physical measurement) certainly differ in terms of how measurement is carried out. Humans generally act as observers, while objects interact with measurement instruments directly [1]. Humans interact with instruments for what we aim to measure resides in the mind of the human respondent. The respondent is assumed to process the wording of the item, recall relevant cognitions, form a mental response, and choose the response option that best fits the mental response. The outcome of this process is a comparison of a statement that characterises, or reflects, the variable to be measured with the respondent’s mental positioning with respect to the same variable

Objectives

Conclusion