Medieval Religious Rationalities: A Weberian Analysis , and: Rationalities in History: A Weberian Essay in Comparison (review)

Abstract

Reviewed by: Medieval Religious Rationalities: A Weberian Analysis, and: Rationalities in History: A Weberian Essay in Comparison Jeffrey Bowman Medieval Religious Rationalities: A Weberian Analysis. By D. L. d’Avray. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 2010. Pp. x, 198. $85.00 cloth-bound, ISBN 978-0-521-76707-1; $29.99 paperback, ISBN 978-0-521-18682-7.) Rationalities in History: A Weberian Essay in Comparison. By D. L. d’Avray. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 2010. Pp. x, 214. $85.00 cloth-bound, ISBN 978-0-521-19920-0; $29.99 paperback, ISBN 978-0-521-12808-7.) In Collected Essays on the Sociology of Religion (Tübingen, 1920–21) and Economy and Society (Tübingen, 1925), Max Weber developed a taxonomy that distinguished four types of rationality. In the pair of studies under review, D. L. d’Avray argues that Weber’s four rationalities (instrumental, [End Page 89] value, formal, and substantive) might be fruitfully applied to the study of history. The two volumes are closely related and best understood as parts of a single argument. In Rationalities in History, the more theoretical of the two volumes, d’Avray reviews the Weberian framework and suggests the rewards of using it to interpret diverse historical evidence. In Medieval Religious Rationalities, he applies Weber’s schema to case studies from the European Middle Ages. In both volumes, the author rejects readings of Weber that describe the rise of rationality as a defining feature of modernity. D’Avray argues convincingly that to accept such readings is to misunderstand both Weber and the premodern world. Gratian’s Decretum, for example, serves as a compelling example of the operation of formal rationality in the medieval period. The Weberian approach has benefits aside from allowing us to cultivate a subtler understanding of the differences between the modern world and the Middle Ages. The diverse examples adduced in Rationalities in History (Azande witch oracles, Hume’s essay on miracles, and Buddhist asceticism, to name a few) dramatize the appealing prospect that Weber’s model can foster broadly comparative approaches to the study of religion and history. D’Avray is especially interested in the interface of different rationalities. In Rationalities in History, the Congregation of the Council, a body formed to interpret the decisions of the Council of Trent, serves as an example of how value rationalities informed formal legal rationalities. In Medieval Religious Rationalities, the interplay of rules and exceptions to rules in canon law illustrates the interface of Weber’s types. In a particularly learned and engaging discussion, d’Avray shows how papal dispensations for marriages within prohibited degrees of consanguinity reflect a symbiosis of formal and substantive rationalities. D’Avray is to be applauded for his range of reference and his eagerness to confront thorny questions about the relation between history and other social sciences rather than indulging in the opportunistic cross-disciplinary borrowing that too often characterizes the boundaries among history, sociology, and anthropology. The works under review are richly thought provoking, but not entirely convincing at every point. The decision to pursue the argument in two volumes is puzzling. Organizing the material in a single volume would have allowed the author to knit the empirical evidence more tightly to the broader theoretical agenda. One also might hope for a more decisive report of what we gain from looking at the past in this way. D’Avray shows that Weber’s scheme might be coherently applied to historical evidence, but it is not always clear what benefits are derived from such applications. One could, for example, read with keen appreciation d’Avray’s insightful account of how medieval religious convictions were parts of inter-locking, mutually reinforcing belief systems without believing that recourse to Weberian models is absolutely necessary. D’Avray’s overarching claim that Weber can help us hone a more precise analytical vocabulary for describing [End Page 90] the choices, preferences, and values of people in societies unlike our own should inspire lively discussion among medievalists, historians in general, and students of religion. Jeffrey Bowman Kenyon College Gambier, OH Copyright © 2012 The Catholic University of America Press