Abstract
Standard arguments in philosophy of science infer from the complexity of biological and neural systems to the presence of emergence and failure of mechanistic/reductionist explanation for those systems. I argue against this kind of argument, specifically focusing on the notion of context-sensitivity. Context-sensitivity is standardly taken to be incompatible with reductionistic explanation, because it shows that larger-scale factors influence the functioning of lower-level parts. I argue that this argument can be overcome if there are mechanisms underlying those context-specific reorganizations. I argue that such mechanisms are frequently discovered in neuroscience.
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