Abstract
Why has Japan failed to fulfill the mission of its 2005 postal privatization legislation? The answer is informal institutions that empower the postmasters within the electoral system and facilitate the mobilization of elites on behalf of anti-reformist goals. To support this claim, I analyze three such institutions: the postmasters’ ownership of postal facilities; the re-employment of former bureaucrats by the postal system and of top postal employees elsewhere in the system; and sales and vote-mobilization quotas. Theoretically, this study analyzes four sources of informal institutional resilience following formal institutional change: the heretofore understudied participation of officialdom in the introduction, communication, and enforcement of informal institutions; the establishment of such institutions prior to new formal rules; institutional duplication across economic sectors; and institutional complementarities.
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