Mechanisms of post-election conflict resolution in Africa's ‘new’ democracies

Abstract

This article examines the crucial issue of post-election conflict resolution in Africa's ‘new’ democracies. Specific attention is devoted to core mechanisms evolved to address electoral corruption and attendant conflicts, notably constitutional frameworks for electoral justice, power-sharing devices, and electoral reform initiatives. The article also evaluates the effectiveness or otherwise of these mechanisms. Though not totally without some cosmetic relief, these mechanisms have largely been inadequate in fostering post-election conflict resolution in Africa, largely because of the nature of the African states, the political economy of power, and poor execution of these mechanisms. The suffocation of the democratic space for post-election conflict resolution by incumbent power holders not only renders these mechanisms ineffective, but also constitutes a major source of democratic instability in Africa's new democracies that must be redressed if democracy is to be consolidated in Africa.